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MERCK & CO. V. REYNOLDS:
SARBANES-OXLEY’S PERPLEXING
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Jordan Ludwig*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Congress expanded the statute of limitations in most
private securities fraud cases as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“Sarbanes-Oxley” or “the Act”).1 This expanded statute of
limitations is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b):
Notwithstanding subsection (a),2 a private right of action
that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation or
contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement
concerning the securities laws, as defined in section
3(a)(47) of the Securities exchange Act of 1934 . . . may be
brought not later than the earlier of—(1) 2 years after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5
years after such violation.3
Since Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment in 2002, the circuit courts of
appeal have been “increasingly divided” over when the statute of
limitations begins to run under § 1658(b)(1)—otherwise known as an

* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. History 2008, University of Maryland,
College Park. I would like to thank all of the editors and staffers of Volume 44 of Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for their hard work in making this Supreme Court issue possible. Elena
DeCoste Grieco, Jeffrey Payne, Oliver Gold, and Andrew Lichtenstein deserve special
recognition for their selfless devotion to the issue. Lastly, thanks to Professor Michael Guttentag
for his sponsorship and helpful feedback during the writing process.
1. 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.16[1]
(4th ed. 2002). Sarbanes-Oxley expanded the statute of limitations from the original statute of
limitations for securities fraud actions: a one-year “discovery” period and a three-year “repose”
period. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m, 78i(e) (2006).
2. Subsection (a) provides a uniform four-year statute of limitations period for all civil
actions arising under a congressional act. Section 1658(a) is not retroactive, and if a congressional
statute states a statute of limitations § 1658(a) does not control.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006).
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“‘inquiry notice’ standard.”4 Specifically, the circuit courts have been
divided over denoting the specific point in time when a plaintiff is
put on sufficient “inquiry notice” such that the expanded statute of
limitations of Sarbanes-Oxley begins to run. This is the issue
addressed in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds.5 The U.S. Supreme Court, in
an increasingly rare proplaintiff opinion,6 held that inquiry notice
does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered, or a
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, the facts of the
violation, including the fact of scienter.7
This Comment examines and analyzes the Court’s holding in
Merck. Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the facts and
procedural history of the case. Part III discusses how the Court
reached its opinion, and Part IV analyzes the holding. Finally, Part V
contains concluding remarks about Merck’s effects on securities
litigation.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Merck arose out of the Vioxx debacle. In the mid-1990s Merck
developed the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx.8 Several months after
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Vioxx, Merck
announced the results of its Vioxx GI Outcomes Research (VIGOR)
study.9 This study showed that Vioxx users suffered fewer
gastrointestinal side effects than users of naproxen (a competing antiinflammatory drug); however, the study also showed that Vioxx
users, as compared to naproxen users, had a greater chance of having
a heart attack.10 Merck responded to these findings by announcing
4. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010)
(No. 08-905).
5. 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010).
6. E.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008)
(holding that customers and suppliers could not be held liable as aiders and abettors in a securities
fraud case because plaintiffs could not demonstrate reliance); Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (raising pleading standards for securities fraud cases).
7. See Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1789–90. It should be noted that Vioxx is the brand name for
the drug rofecoxib.
8. Id. at 1790.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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that the disparity was due to naproxen’s ability to block platelet
aggregation—a quality that Vioxx did not share.11 In other words,
Vioxx did not cause heart attacks, but rather, Naproxen conferred an
additional benefit upon its users. This became known as the
“naproxen hypothesis.”12
Debate about the naproxen hypothesis continued into 2001. In
May 2001, a group of plaintiffs sued Merck on a products liability
claim that Vioxx users were four times more likely to suffer heart
attacks than naproxen users.13 Further, in August 2001, the Journal of
the American Medical Association wrote that the cardiovascular data
“raised a ‘cautionary flag’ and strongly urged that ‘a trial specifically
assessing cardiovascular risk’ be done.”14 Around the same time, a
leading news outlet quoted a Merck scientist who expressed support
for the naproxen hypothesis.15 Shortly thereafter, the FDA sent
Merck a warning letter, which Merck released to the public, stating
that Merck’s Vioxx marketing was “‘false, lacking in fair balance, or
otherwise misleading’”; however, the FDA acknowledged that the
naproxen hypothesis was a “‘possible explanation’” for the
disparity.16 In response, Merck reexamined its data and claimed that
there was “no evidence that Vioxx increased the risk of heart
attacks” and once again advanced the naproxen hypothesis.17
With this basic groundwork laid, the Court sets forth three
important events that occurred between October 2003 and November
2004. In October 2003, the Wall Street Journal published the results
of a Merck-funded Vioxx study that concluded that Vioxx users were
37 percent more likely to have heart attacks than those given a
substitute drug.18 Merck nevertheless defended Vioxx.19 Then, in
September 2004, Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market because of
a new study confirming that Vioxx increased the likelihood of heart
attacks.20 While Merck claimed these results were “‘totally
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1791.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1791–92.
Id. at 1792.
Id.
Id.
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unexpected,’” in November 2004, the Wall Street Journal published
another article stating that Merck “‘fought forcefully for years to
keep safety concerns from destroying the drug’s commercial
prospects.’”21 The plaintiffs in Merck brought suit shortly before
Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market.22 The plaintiffs alleged that
Merck defrauded its investors “by promoting the naproxen
hypothesis, knowing the hypothesis was false.”23
B. Procedural History
In the District Court of New Jersey, Merck moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs knew or should have
known the “‘facts constituting the violation’” at least two years
earlier; therefore, the statute of limitations had expired.24 The district
court granted Merck’s motion, holding that the VIGOR study, the
FDA warning letter, and Merck’s response to the letter should have
alerted the plaintiffs to the possibility that Merck had knowingly
misrepresented the dangers of Vioxx.25 As such, the plaintiffs had
been put on inquiry notice.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
opinion.26 While the Third Circuit held that these events constituted
“‘storm warnings,’” the events did not “suggest much by the way of
scienter [an essential element of a securities fraud case], and
consequently did not put the plaintiffs on ‘inquiry notice.’”27 Merck
appealed to the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split over when
the statute of limitations begins to run under § 1658(b)(1).28
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
Recall that under § 1658(b)(1) the statute of limitations in a
securities fraud case begins to run “2 years after the discovery of the
facts constituting the violation.”29 The first part of the Supreme
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1792–93.
Id. at 1793.
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1) (2006).
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Court’s opinion held that the word “‘discovery’ in [§ 1658(b)(1)]
refers not only to a plaintiff’s actual discovery of certain facts, but
also to the facts that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have
discovered.”30 How did the Supreme Court reach this ruling when it
is not clear from the face of the statute?
The Court applied principles of general fraud in reaching its
decision. There is a history of precedent supporting the principle that
the statute of limitations in a fraud case should not begin to run until
the plaintiff has become aware of the injury. For example, in
Holmberg v. Armbrecht,31 the Supreme Court held that “where a
plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it
without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of
the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.”32 In
the context of statutes of limitation, this is known as the “‘discovery
rule.’”33 The Court went on to note that in more recent years, state
and federal courts have employed the discovery rule for claims other
than fraud, including instances where the legislature has simply used
the word “discovery” in the statute.34 For example, after the Court
established an implied private right of action for § 10(b),35 every
court of appeals to interpret the term “discovery” has held that
discovery “occur[ed] not only once a plaintiff actually discover[ed]
the facts, but also when a . . . reasonably diligent plaintiff would
have discovered them.”36 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
“discovery,” as used in § 1658(b)(1), includes discovery of those
facts that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered.37
The second issue the Court resolved was what encompassed “the
facts constituting the violation.”38 This is the heart of the decision
30. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793.
31. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
32. Id. at 1794 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)).
33. Id. at 1793.
34. Id. at 1794.
35. The Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350
(1991), used the statute of limitations for securities price-manipulation cases found in 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(e). Id. at 364 n. 9. Under this provision, the Court held that “private § 10(b) actions ‘must
be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and
within three years after such violation.’” Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1795 (quoting Lampf, 501 U.S. at
364).
36. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1795.
37. Id. at 1796.
38. Id.
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because if scienter were not included in the “facts constituting the
violation” the plaintiffs could not prevail. Merck argued that a
plaintiff did not need to possess information indicating that the
defendant had acted with scienter in order to establish inquiry
notice.39 On the other hand, the respondents argued that the statute of
limitations began “with discovery of the elements of a violation,
including scienter.”40 The Supreme Court agreed with the
respondents that knowledge of scienter was a necessary element to
start the statute of limitations.41
The Court reached this result by emphasizing the importance of
scienter in establishing a securities fraud (particularly, a § 10(b)
violation).42 Under § 10(b), plaintiffs “cannot recover without
proving that a defendant made a material misstatement with an intent
to deceive—not merely innocently or negligently.”43 Additionally,
the Court noted not only that is scienter an essential element of the
claim but also that Congress has enacted heightened pleading
standards for this requirement.44 Accordingly, the Court was
concerned that it would be far too easy for potential defendants to
conceal their intent to deceive for the two-year statute of limitations
period.45
The Court’s opinion expressly rejects Merck’s arguments. First,
Merck argued that facts or misleading statements are sufficient to
show scienter in and of themselves.46 The Court disagreed and
provided, by way of example, that “[a]n incorrect prediction about a
firm’s future earnings, by itself, does not automatically tell us
whether the speaker deliberately lied or just made an innocent (and
therefore nonactionable) error.”47 In this respect, Merck argued that
requiring knowledge of scienter to commence the statute of
limitations would revive stale claims;48 however, the Court

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Brief for the Petitioners at 19–20, Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905).
Brief for Respondents at 21, Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905) (emphasis added).
Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1796.
Id. at 1796–98.
Id. at 1796.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1797.
Id.
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responded by noting that § 1658(b)(2) gives defendants total repose
after five years from the date of the violation.49
Second, Merck argued that the limitations period began to run
once plaintiffs had a “quantum of information sufficiently suggestive
of wrongdoing that [plaintiffs] should conduct a further inquiry.”50
Once again, the Court rejected this point because the plaintiffs had
not necessarily discovered facts showing scienter or other facts of the
violation. Since scienter is a fact constituting the violation, if the
Court allowed the statute of limitations to run merely because a
plaintiff discovered facts that would have reasonably led him to
investigate further, the statute of limitations would run before
discovery of the “facts constituting the violation,” that is, scienter.51
This is contrary to the federal statute, which contains no language
suggesting that the statute of limitations can begin prior to
discovery.52
Lastly, Merck argued that determining when a “hypothetical
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have ‘discover[ed]’ the necessary
facts is too complicated for judges to undertake.”53 The Court flatly
rejected this contention and stated that at least five circuit courts
already engage in this type of inquiry in securities fraud cases.54 In
sum, the Court held that under § 1658(b)(1) the statute of limitations
only begins to run once the plaintiff discovers, or a reasonably
diligent plaintiff would have discovered, the facts constituting the
violation, including scienter, regardless of whether the plaintiff
undertook a reasonably diligent investigation.55
Finally, the Court addressed whether the plaintiffs in this case
had discovered, or should have discovered, the facts constituting the
violation, including scienter. Merck argued that the FDA’s warning
letter and the pleadings filed in the previous products liability actions

49. Id.
50. Id. This language is similar to the approach taken by the some of the circuit courts. E.g.
Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002); Great Rivers Coop. of Se.
Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1997); Fujisawa Pharma. Co. v.
Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1335–36 (7th Cir. 1997).
51. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1797.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1798.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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should have given the plaintiffs the facts constituting the violation.56
The Court rejected this and held that neither of these facts, “whether
viewed separately or together, reveal ‘facts’ indicating scienter.”57
Therefore, the plaintiffs did not “discover” facts relating to scienter,
and their claim was not barred under the statute of limitations as set
forth in § 1658(b)(1).58
IV. ANALYSIS
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been decidedly
prodefendant in securities law cases.59 From a plaintiff’s perspective,
Merck is a welcome exception to this trend. Of the three approaches
taken by the circuit courts of appeal,60 the Supreme Court elected to
adopt the most proplaintiff one—and in a unanimous decision
nonetheless. This part analyzes the strengths of the Merck decision as
well as one shortcoming of the opinion. Overall, however, this author
believes that the Merck decision is a well-reasoned opinion that will
go a long way in helping preserve the legal rights of securities fraud
plaintiffs.
First and foremost, plaintiffs in securities fraud cases face one
less procedural hurdle in vindicating their rights. The element of
scienter has become an increasingly important part of securities
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1798–99.
Id. at 1799.
Id.
See James Dugan, Staying in Compliance with New Securities Law Requirements, in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAWS: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING
RECENT DECISIONS, NAVIGATING NEW SEC INITIATIVES, AND ESTABLISHING COMPLIANCE
POLICIES 3 (2010) (noting that between 2005 and 2008 there was a trifecta of prodefendant
decisions); Andrew C. W. Lund, Opting Out of Good Faith, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 393, 433
n.201 (2010) (“[T]he post-PSLRA proliferation of ‘bright-line rules’ regarding scienter
allegations [have been] generally prodefendant . . . .”).
60. The circuit courts have adopted at least three main approaches to defining the statute of
limitations in § 1658(b). Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 20. The first approach,
dubbed “Pure ‘Storm Warnings’” by the petitioner in Merck, has been applied by the Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id. Under this approach, the statute of limitations begins to
run “from the moment that there exist[s] ‘storm warnings’ of possible fraud.” Id. The second
approach, taken by the First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and sometimes Second Circuits, has been
dubbed the “‘Storm Warnings’ Plus Investigation” approach. Id. at 21. Under this approach, the
statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the plaintiff is actually or constructively aware
of the violation and could have discovered the alleged fraud through investigation. Id. Lastly, the
third approach, applied by the Third and Ninth Circuits, is nearly identical to the second approach
but does not require investigation. Id. at 23. Under the third approach, the statute of limitations
begins to run when plaintiffs have knowledge of the facts constituting the violation, including
scienter. Id. at 23–24.
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cases. The U.S. Code requires that a plaintiff’s complaint “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.”61 This heightened pleading
standard, further defined in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd.,62 has received vocal criticism from scholars.63 In fact, at least
one scholar has suggested that the pleading standard for securities
fraud cases post-Tellabs is unconstitutional.64 While this assertion
may be overstated, the point is this: scienter is an extremely
important element in a securities fraud case, and if plaintiffs have
any hope of making it past a motion to dismiss, they must plead it
with particularity.
So how does Merck help plaintiffs overcome this difficult
hurdle? By requiring knowledge of scienter to commence the twoyear statute of limitations, plaintiffs do not have to worry about filing
suit with possibly incomplete knowledge because of mere “storm
warnings” that suggest fraud. Corporate defendants are sophisticated
entities that often have the top legal counsel available. As such,
plaintiffs cannot count on easily finding facts that can lead to the
“strong inference of scienter.”65
Had the Court chosen an alternative approach to beginning the
statute of limitations, then after committing securities fraud, a
potential defendant could leak information that would constitute
storm warnings. This would require a plaintiff to file suit before the
two-year statute of limitations expires with incomplete information
(assuming he did not have facts constituting the required strong
inference of scienter). Though a plaintiff may ultimately find the
requisite information to surpass the heightened pleading standard in a
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006); see also Suja A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL
L. REV. 633, 638–39 (2010) (“Under the PSLRA, to survive a motion to dismiss, in a securities
fraud complaint, a plaintiff must have pled misleading statements with ‘particularity’ and pled ‘a
strong inference’ of scienter.”).
62. 551 U.S. 308, 313, 317, 321, 324 (2007).
63. See e.g., John M. Wunderlich, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing
Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 690 (2008) (stating that the Tellabs decision has had “many
negative ramifications”).
64. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1851 (2008).
65. In Tellabs, the Court held that during the pleading stage, courts must consider
“competing inferences” that may be drawn from factual allegations. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.
Further, the court held that “[a] complaint will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would
deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one
could draw from the facts alleged.” Id.
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motion to dismiss, he may also exhaust limited funding in the
litigation’s pleadings stage. The process of filing several amended
complaints is extraordinarily burdensome, and, if the plaintiff cannot
discover facts allowing the “strong inference” of scienter, the
complaint may ultimately be dismissed with prejudice.
Under Merck, potential plaintiffs are no longer pressured to file
suit while lacking necessary knowledge (unless the five-year repose
period66 will expire). The effects of this change should be increased
judicial economy, decreased litigation costs for both parties,
increased likelihood of adjudicating securities fraud cases on the
merits, and decreased filing of lawsuits that are unlikely to succeed.
All of these goals are desirable, and in this author’s opinion, they are
important steps in helping restore the balance of fairness for
plaintiffs.
Overall, Merck was an “excellent” and well-reasoned opinion
that effectively responded to all of the defendants’ persuasive
arguments.67 However, the opinion expressly reserves an important
question: “[W]e say nothing about other facts necessary to support a
private § 10(b) action.”68 The elements of a § 10(b) action are (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation.69
In Merck, the United States filed an amicus brief, arguing that
the “facts constituting the violation” in § 1658(b)(1) were limited to
the first three of these elements.70 Accordingly, the government
agreed with Merck that reliance, economic loss, and loss causation,
were not facts constituting the violation.71 The Court, however,
expressed no opinion on whether these elements constitute facts of
the violation.
What will the impact of this ambiguity be? One leading law firm
argues that “there are probably few circumstances in which a
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2). This section serves as an “unqualified bar on actions instituted
‘5 years after [the] violation’ . . . .” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1797 (2010).
67. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens compliments Justice Breyer’s majority opinion as
“convincing and correct.” Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1799 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 1796 (majority opinion).
69. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
70. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, Merck, 130
S. Ct. 1784 (No. 08-905).
71. Id. at 12 n.1.
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plaintiff could discover a material misstatement made with
fraudulent intent, but would not otherwise be on constructive notice
of facts that would satisfy these other elements.”72 There is certainly
merit to this argument. It is difficult to conceive of a situation where
this might occur; however, it is not impossible.
For instance, a plaintiff could learn of clandestine information
relating to Hypothetical Corporation X’s material misrepresentation
and fraudulent intent, yet, the public at large is not privy to this
information. Next, suppose that since the information is private,
Corporation X’s stock does not suffer. Therefore, the plaintiff would
have no economic loss and could not bring a viable securities fraud
claim. If after two years, however, the information became public
and the price of Corporation X’s stock plummeted, the plaintiff has
now suffered the economic loss necessary to bring a lawsuit. But
because the two-year statute of limitations has expired, it is
questionable whether the plaintiff can sue Corporation X. While the
plaintiff was aware of the “elements constituting the violation” under
the government’s definition, he or she was not technically aware of
the damages element because it did not yet exist.
This situation may be a rare one, but the law is replete with
bizarre factual scenarios. The Court had the opportunity to hold
whether the remaining elements of a securities fraud violation
constitute the “facts of the violation.”73 Instead, it chose to reserve
the question. This form of reservation, however, may result in
another circuit split, which might ultimately require the Court to
examine this issue in detail.
One may argue that in a hypothetical such as the one above, the
plaintiff has a duty to inform the public of the fraud, and therefore is
guilty of sitting on his rights. Accordingly, the plaintiff should not be
allowed to bring his suit anyway. This author disagrees. Plaintiffs
who bring securities fraud actions may have no desire to harm the
corporation in which they have invested unless and until they have
been harmed themselves. A common stock shareholder should have
72. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds: U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Statute of Limitations in
Securities Fraud Cases, DAVIS POLK (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.davispolk.com (search “U.S.
Supreme Court clarifies” and follow article hyperlink).
73. Even though the Court had the opportunity to rule on this matter, it is ordinarily not
supposed to rule beyond the questions to which it granted certiorari. Therefore, it is difficult to
actually criticize the Court for not ruling on this matter.
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no duty to other shareholders, or to the general public, to inform
them of the knowledge to which he has been privy.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, Merck is an excellent decision and a welcome departure
from the Court’s spate of prodefendant decisions in securities fraud
cases. Another leading defense firm stated on its website that “the
number of § 10(b) complaints dismissed under the two-year statute
of limitations will likely fall.”74 This is a desirable goal in this
author’s opinion. Cases should be heard on the merits rather than
dismissed under procedural nuances. The holding in Merck not only
helps give plaintiffs a fairer chance to vindicate their rights, it will
help keep corporations in check.
Nevertheless, the Merck Court reserved the questions of whether
reliance, economic loss, and loss causation constitute facts of a
securities violation. The government and a leading law firm argue
that they do not and that a situation is unlikely to arise where a
plaintiff will be aware of an intentional material misrepresentation
and not the final three elements. While this argument does not lack
merit, as this Comment demonstrates, there are factual scenarios
where this might occur. Accordingly, it is conceivable that this issue
may make its way to the Supreme Court again in the future.

74. Andrew B. Weissmann et al., What Does Merck & Co. v. Reynolds Mean for the Future
of the Statute of Limitations Defense in Securities Fraud Litigation?, WILMER HALE (May 4,
2010), http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=9489.

